This whole blog post makes me sad. I've been active on both sides of the vulnerability disclosure process for well over a decade and have reported a whole bunch [1] of security bugs to the Go security team. I was there back when Filippo was running the show and have continued since Roland took over. My experience with the people there has always been great.

> Ultimately, it all stems from our responsibility to our users. The security researchers are not special, the insight and confidentiality are, and we need them to keep our users safe. Ignoring a security report communicates you don’t care about users’ security, and it’s rightly a reason for shame.

100%. This was always true and I still think it is. LLMs don't change anything. At most they shift the balance and force a temporary compromise.

> LLMs are as good as almost any security researcher

This statement is extremely dependent on the definition of a security researcher. It might hold if you consider anyone with a HackerOne account, but if you restrict the definition to people who actually put in some effort, it's just not true. LLMs can find some real vulnerabilities, yes, but they also spew unprecedented volumes of garbage that an expert can immediately recognize as such.

> The insight is not scarce and precious anymore. The bottleneck now is not finding potential issues but assessing which ones are real.

Assessing which ones are real should be part of the insight. Real researchers will not submit 150 pages of spam, and three real bugs hidden in 150 pages of spam are not insight. In most cases a researcher will spend significant effort on triage before submitting anything, and an LLM still cannot do that reliably.

> Confidentiality, embargoes, and coordination also don’t matter nearly as much as they used to.

I'd argue these now matter more: the one thing LLMs do seem to do fairly well is figure out specific things based on sufficient information and a scope that's limited enough. So a plain commit containing a security fix is now much easier and cheaper to turn into an exploit than it was before.

> The years of vulnerability reports being special might be over, as weird and uncomfortable as that feels.

I'd hope not. Bug bounties might be over unless someone can figure out the spam problem, but disclosure programs that don't offer monetary incentives are probably just going through a tough period that will eventually calm down as the operators of LLMs realize the costs and do the math.

Unreliable reports have always been an issue and will remain one, LLMs or no. When it gets worse, like in the current influx of LLM-generated reports, the focus should be on identifying reliable researchers, building relationships, and providing guidance on how they can make the reports easier to triage.

Researchers are not special, but the insight they can provide totally is. LLMs might force everyone to make better use of that insight, instead of just consuming bug reports and drowning in triage.

[1] https://groups.google.com/g/golang-announce/search?q=juho

Vulnerability reports are not special anymore