    > but they still block penetration testing and other techniques more likely to be used by attackers.
    > 
    > Haiku 5.5’s biology safeguards are the same as for Sonnet 5, Sonnet 5.5, and Opus 5. They allow research biology questions but restrict access to requests that we judge as likely to cause harm. Organizations working on wider-ranging biology and cyber activities can apply to our Life Sciences Verification Program and Cyber Verification Program.

I would like to take a moment of your time to tell you about some of the "bioweapons" Anthropic has blocked that involved Haiku!

These are the examples from "Detecting and countering misuse of AI: September 2026" - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=49647300

    > Importantly, because our biological safety classifiers robustly block content involving high-risk biological research (in this case, the construction of enhanced pandemic potential pathogens), all of these exchanges occurred on models in our weakest class of models (specifically, the models were Claude Sonnet 4 and Haiku 4.5, the latter of which the user began using after Sonnet 4 was deprecated). 
    >
    > Upon a detailed examination of the exchanges, we estimate that the uplift provided by Claude was primarily clerical assistance in data analysis, study ideation and design. This is consistent with our understanding of the capabilities of Sonnet 4 and Haiku 4.5, which are not able to perform expert-level biology research tasks; we estimate that the uplift provided to the researcher was limited and substantially lower than it would have been from one of our more capable models.

Anthropic then says for the above, "we estimate that the uplift provided by Claude was primarily clerical assistance in data analysis, study ideation and design"

While doing my best to avoid comment, please note, they're talking about a domain expert in a state research institution using Claude to do paperwork.

What did they save us from? What bioweapons did these filters prevent? From the front matter report,

    > The above LLM platform is not the only route via which researchers engaged in viral gain-of-function research have used our platform. In May 2026, we discovered a researcher outside the US using Claude in their research on highly-pathogenic avian influenza (“bird flu”). The research focused on viruses’ adaptation to mammals, and the mechanism by which it causes severe disease beyond the respiratory tract.

OK. Sounds serious. "Gain of function research..." but who and why?

    > The researcher pursued this work in a credible institutional context, and interacted with Claude over the course of several weeks, exchanging thousands of messages. In these exchanges, the researcher leveraged Claude’s knowledge of the scientific literature to assist the researcher in study planning and design, data analysis, and the interpretation and prioritization of experiments. The researcher also used Claude for editorial assistance in writing up the research.

So this was a researcher inside of some country's national lab ("credible institutional context") doing research on dangerous viruses using Claude for "for editorial assistance in writing up the research."

What "uplift" are you providing to scientists working at specialized global BSL-4 labs that already have – and I quote their report - "physical access to such isolates." (as in samples of viruses)? Are we uplifting their grammar?

These "safeguards" are being expanded. The scientists I know can't use Claude for grammar checks or anything serious. You can try it for yourself.

Claude Haiku 5.5